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I.

INTRODUCTION.
In 2015, Plaintiffs/Respondents Bonnie and Matt Latvala ("the Latvalas") purchased the

south half of property known as the ~-sulphide Lode," a landlocked patented mining claim on Lake
Pend Oreille.
At the time of the Latvalas' purchase, they knew that the property enjoyed no legal right of
access off of the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road. There real estate agent (Christian
Thompson) described the property as "boat access only." Ex. DDD (R., p. 682). The listing
information for Sulphide South specifically stated, "No legal access over South Camp Bay Road."
Ex. XX (R., p. 664). The Latvalas' title policy specifically excluded recorded access over South
Camp Bay Road. Ex. MMM (R., p.729).
None of these facts should have come as a surprise. The Seller took pains to sell the property
"as is," and with "no representation" as to "road access." Ex. JJJ (R., p. 714). In fact, the Seller had
previously been unsuccessful in attempting to negotiate for recorded easement access over South
Camp Bay Road. Exs. 00, PP, and QQ. 1
The purchase price paid for Sulphide South reflected the property's lack of access. The
listing price for the property had been gradually reduced, over time, from $600,000.00 to
$300,000.00 to $175,000.00. Exs. NN and YY (R., pp. 639-40 and 668-71). Sulphide South was
listed for $150,000.00 when the Seller accepted the Latvalas' $100,000.00 offer. Ex. YY (R., p.
1

Exhibits 00, PP, and QQ are included in the Record on Appeal pursuant to this Court's
March 24, 2020 "Order Granting Motion to Augment."
1

669). The Sellers, who had owned the property for 30 years prior, admitted they had no legal road
access to the Latvala property and unsuccessfully tried to obtain the same.
The Latvalas nonetheless brought suit, attempting to establish a right of access over South
Camp Bay Road under a multitude of theories. The "facts" in support of these theories dated back
60 to 100 years. The facts offered by the Latvalas in support of their claim for a prescriptive right
were facts of which neither the Latvalas nor any other living witness had personal knowledge.
Nearly all of the evidence related to the claim of an adverse right was based upon "ancient
documents," i.e., documents being "at least 30 years old" and admissible under IRE 803(16). The
Latvalas attempted to create a supportable claim of adverse use by selectively omitting documents
which undermined their claim (for example, Ex. DD (R., p. 592-601)). Alternatively, where
documentation did not support their claimed right, the Latvalas simply characterized the same as
"incorrect." See Respondents' /Cross-Appellants' Brief at p. 27.
The law does not favor easements by prescription. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,
570 P.2d 870 (1977). That is why the proponent of such a claim bears a burden of proof under the
clear and convincing standard. Elderv. Northwest Timber Co,, 101 Idaho 356, 358-59, 613 P.2d 367
(1980). Clear and convincing evidence is more than a mere preponderance. Where the evidence is
in conflict, inherently contradictory, or simply lacking in reasonable certainty, then the same cannot
be said to be "clear and convincing." The District Court's finding can only be sustained if one
effectively ignores equally competent evidence, instead making a selective determination of
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historical facts of which no witness had personal knowledge.
II.

ARGUMENT AS TO APPELLANTS' ISSUES ON APPEAL.
A.

This Court's "Substantial Evidence" Inquiry on Appeal Must be Viewed
in the Lens of the "Clear and Convincing" Standard.

Because easements by prescription are not favored at law, a claimant must present clear and
convincing evidence of each of the required elements. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702, 963
P.2d 383, 385 (1998). "Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be 'evidence
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain."' A&B Irrigation
District v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 15 3 Idaho 500, 516, 284 P. 3d 225, 241 (2012)
(citing State v. Kimball, 145 Idaho 542, 546, 181 P.3d 468, 472 (2008)).
On appeal, this Court does not "disturb findings of fact that are supported by substantial and
competent evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,
394, 210 P. 3d 7 5, 79 (2009). Yet the substantiali ty and competency of the evidence must be viewed
in the context of the applicable burden of proof. In other words, this Court's review should focus
on whether or not there is substantial and competent evidence, under a clear and convincing
standard, to support the District Court's finding of a prescriptive easement. Appellants respectfully
submit that there is no substantial and competent evidence necessary to sustain a finding that the
Latvalas had proven an adverse right by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., evidence which was
highly probable, reasonably certain, and free from doubt.
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B.

Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Latvalas' Proof of a
Prescriptive Easement by Clear and Convincing Evidence.

1.

The District Court Ignored Substantial and Competent Evidence
Supporting the Reason ahie Conclusion That the Lower Adit Was
Initially Located and Developed by Boat Access.

The District Court found that the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road "appears to have
been the access road to the lower tunnel at the Sulphide Lode," and that "absolutely no historical
evidence was presented at trial showing that the miners traveled to and from the lower tunnel by
boat." R., p. 2054. Substantial and competent evidence shows that the District Court's findings are
not sustainable under the clear and convincing standard required.
In 1909, the United States issued a patent to the Sulphide Claim to Messrs. Teap, Garrison,
Hipke, and VanHemert. Ex. M (R., pp. 551-53). The Latvalas failed to produce a map of any road
that extended to the Sulphide Road prior to 1949. Ex. 51 (R., pp. 195-196). A 1951 United States
Geological Survey ("USGS") map is reproduced at page 15 of Respondents' brief (Ex. 52 (R., pp.
197-198)). Like the 1949 map (Ex. 51 ), the 19 51 map does not show the lower branch of South
Camp Bay Road extending over and across the intervening property of the U.S.F.S. (280+/- feet) to
the Sulphide Claim. The maps do, however, show the upper branch of South Camp Bay Road
(interchangeably referred to as "Thomason Road") extending to Thomason's group of unpatented
claims (including the "Honest John" claim), at the western edge of the Sulphide Lode.

It should not be surprising that there is no earlier mapping showing access to the Sulphide
Lode by virtue of South Camp Bay Road, be it the upper or lower branch. South Camp Bay Road
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extends from the terminus of Camp Bay Road, a public road.

Yet Camp Bay Road was not

established until a 1907 Viewer's Report, which showed no extensions off of Camp Bay Road in the
current location of South Camp Bay Road. Ex. I (R., p. 539). Moreover, no easement was granted
over the present-day property of Green Enterprises, Inc., so as to facilitate the extension of South
Camp Bay Road southeasterly from the Green Enterprises' property (then owned by John Van
Schravendyk) to the Cedar Side property (then owned by Lida Putnam) until 1927, some twenty (20)
years after the Sulphide Claim was patented. Ex. N (R., pp. 554-55). At the time Van Schravendyk
and Putnam agreed, "The [easement] road would still be private each owning our present part as the
title." Ex. T (Green Enterprises) (T, p. 858).
The evidence at trial established that the Sulphide Lode veins were discovered and located
in 1912. Ex. 78 (R., pp. 290-91). With no evidence of any road at the time, the only alternative
means of access, particularly to the lower adit, would have had to have been by boat. Evidence was
admitted establishing the reasonable and logical contemporaneous use of boat access by the same
parties who initially developed and located the Sulphide Lode.
Local newspaper coverage from 1906 (four years before the Sulphide Lode patent was issued)
showed that VanHemert and Garrison, two of the four patentees to the Sulphide Lode, accessed
neighboring mining properties by boat. Exhibit CCCC (R., p. 757). Still other newspaper coverage
at the time indicated that all four patentees (Garrison, Teap, Hipke and VanHemert) were working
a neighboring claim by "a tunnel which is being run near the water level of the lake," and the same
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parties owned and were developing the Sulphide Lode. Ex. ODDO (R., p. 758). Other press
coverage noted that Garrison "took a pick and went along the shores of the lake after a grub stake."
Ex. BBB (R., p. 756).
The evidence unquestionably shows that the Sulphide Lode was originally located and
developed before there were any roads, be they the upper branch or the lower branch South Camp
Bay Road. The evidence also supports the reasonable and probable inference that the parties who
located and initially developed the Sulphide Lode accessed the same by boat. These points are of
critical importance when one subsequently examines evidence offered of activity on the Sulphide
Lode between 1946 and 1954. Appellants are not, as Respondents suggest, simply asking this Court
to "reweigh conflicting evidence and to second guess the trial court." See Respondents' Brief at p.
13. To the contrary, Appellants are asking this Court to determine whether or not the District
Court's findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the clear and convincing standard.
One cannot find, as the District Court did, that there was "no historical evidence" that the lower
tunnel was accessed by boat. 2

2

There is no other inference that one can reach except that Garrison, Hipke, VanHemert and
Teap accessed the lower adit by boat. Plaintiffs admitted that they "don't know how they [Teap,
Garrison] got there [to the Sulphide Lode];" have ''no personal knowledge of how they got there;"
and that there is no "map of the Sulphide Lode property prior to 1939." Tr., pp. 422-23.
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2.

Evidence That the Lower Adit Was Mined Between 1946 and
1954, by Access Off of the Lower Extension of South Camp Bay
Road, Was Not "Clear and Convincing."

Following trial, the District Court concluded that from 1946 to 1954, "the Sulphide Lode was
an active mining claim, and the Lower Branch of the road, in the location of present-day South Camp
Bay Road, was used by vehicles year round to transport manpower, materials, supplies, and
equipment to the lower tunnel." R., pp. 2061-2062. The District Court's holding was not supported
by substantial evidence in light of the required "clear and convincing" standard.
As set forth above, the record is devoid of any evidence as to how the original patentees of
the Sulphide Lode (Garrison, Hipke, Teap, and VanHemert) accessed the property. The record is
devoid ofany evidence ofany map prior to 1949 showing the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road
in its present location. Ex. 51 (R., pp. 195-196). This should not be surprising because Government
Lots 1 and 2 (the former Putnam property), the properties specifically benefitted by the easement
granted by Van Schravendyk (now Green Enterprises, Inc.) over Government Lot 1 in 1927, were
not platted into residential lots until 1947. Ex. P (R., p. 557). A copy of Ex.Pis attached as
Addendum L to Appellants' Opening Brief.
In 1939, Howard Thomason purchased the Sulphide Lode at a tax sale. Ex. BB (R., pp. 57778). On October 24, 1939, Thomason, together, with Fred Schilling, recorded separate "notices of
mining claim" for several unpatented claims (including the Honest John Claim), lying contiguous
to the Sulphide Lode. R., pp. 1681-82 (1113-16). These claims are collectively shown on Ex. CC
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(R., p. 591), a copy of which is attached as Addendum E to Appellants' Opening Brief. The Honest
John Claim lies northwesterly of, and adjacent to, the Sulphide Claim, on property now owned by
the U.S.F.S.
In 1939, Thomason's partner (Fred Schilling) "built and equipped a 25 ton mill (which
should not have [been] done at that time) and neglected to do any amount of development work on
the claims." Ex. BB (R., pp. 577-78) (emphasis added). Schilling then "lost this equipment for
defaulting in his payments, all work stopped, and the property remained idle through 1946." Ex. BB
(R., pp. 577-78). In 1940, Thomason and Schilling filed a Proof of labor as to the unpatented group
of claims adjacent to the Sulphide Lode (including the Honest John Claim), reflecting work done in
1939. R., p. 1651 (,rl 7).
Some forty years later, in a 1982 affidavit recorded as Bonner County Instrument No.
254472, Thomason stated: "That the road to the said Sulphide Mining Claim was in existence prior
to 1938. In 1938 said Affiant helped to extend said road within said claim." Ex. U (R., pp. 568)
(emphasis added). Since there was no evidence of a lower branch of South Camp Bay Road in
existence as of 1939, the road which Thomason extended "within" the Sulphide Claim could only
have been off of the "upper branch," also referred to in these proceedings as the "Thomason Road."
This is consistent with the October 18, 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. map independently prepared as part
of those agencies' inspection of the Site. Ex. DD (R., p. 599) (a copy is attached as Addendum H
to the Appellants' Opening Brief).
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In 1946, Thomason described access to the Sulphide Lode as consisting of access on a
"county road from Sagle, Idaho within one-half mile of [the] property, private road balance of
distance."

Ex. BB (R., p. 580).

This is consistent with the map prepared in 1954 by

U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. The County road is, by inference, Camp Bay Road. The remaining "private
road" is that portion of South Camp Bay Road consisting of the upper branch/Thomason Road, as
shown by the U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. 1954 map.
Thomason recorded a Proof of labor on his unpatented claims (including the Honest John)
in 1948 for work performed in 1947. R., p. 1651-52 (ifl8). No further proofs of labor would be
recorded for any work on any claim until I 954, when a proof of labor was recorded evidencing work
completed the same year. R., p. 1652 (ifl 9). 1954 is the same year when Thomason entered into a
mining lease encompassing all of the claim with George Johnson and E. Vernon Anderson. Ex. 80
(R., pp. 307-08). As lessees, Johnson and Anderson applied for federal assistance from the U.S.
Department of the Interior under the "Defense Minerals Exploration Administration" (DMEA). Exs.
CC; DD (R., pp.583-601).
The Latvalas state in their Response Brief, at p. 8, HHoward Thomason, who acquired the
Sulphide Load property in 1939, caused the two mines [the upper and lower adits] located on the
property to be extensively worked from 1946 through at least 1954 .... " The evidence showed that
no proofs of labor had been filed for the years 1947 through 1953. Moreover, the Latvalas' own
evidence contradicted the bona tides of their assertion of "extensive" mining operations between
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1946 and 1954. Specifically, in 1954, Anderson and Johnson represented, "There has been no past
production in either the upper or lower tunnels." Ex. 79 (R., p. 304). The Latvalas argue to this
Court the 1954 statement by Anderson and Johnson "is incorrect." See Respondents' Response Brief
at p. 26. The Latvalas state that Anderson and Johnson's "statement as to past production was
incorrect." Id at . 27. In support of their position, the Latvalas cite to a 1954 "Review of
Examination Report," prepared by U.S. Bureau of Mines in conj unction with the D MEA application
filed by Anderson and Johnson. Ex. 78 (R., pp. 288-96). In that report, the U.S.B.M. author recites
second hand information that ore shipments were made from the property from 194 7 through 1951.
Id. at p. 291. The two statements are inherently contradictory.
The Latvalas focus on the statement they believe aids their claim. Appellants focus on the
statement, actually authored by Johnson and Anderson, which acknowledges "no past production in
either the upper or lower tunnels" as of 1954. Appellants respectfully suggest that this is why the
law requires that claims for prescriptive easements be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
One can question how can evidence be clear and convincing when it is offered in the
following context. First, no witness had any personal knowledge of any fact or matter related to the
claim. Second, the only source of information is "ancient documents," being over thirty years old,
of which none of the witnesses had personal knowledge. Third, to make matters worse, those
documents were, as noted, inherently contradictory. A decision to accept the statement from the
1954 "Review of Examination Report" (Ex. 78) over the contemporaneous statement of the Lessees
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(Ex. 79) cannot be based upon any substantial or competent evidence. The Latvalas suggest that
Johnson and Anderson, in acknowledging no prior production as of 1954, "were mistaken." But the
Latvalas have no personal knowledge of the same, nor did any other witness.
For the District Court to hold as it did, it would have to essentially pick and choose from
equally competent evidence over which no witness had personal knowledge. Appellants respectfully
suggest that the Latvalas could not have carried their burden under a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, let alone a "clear and convincing" standard. Clear and convincing evidence is
evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. See,~'
In Re: Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 957, 277 P.3d 400 (2012). Given that no witness has any personal
knowledge of any fact or matter relative to the claim at issue, how can it be determined that one of
Johnson's and Anderson's statements was "reasonably certain" or "highly probable," but the other
one was not?
We do know, based upon the August 12, 1954 U.S.B.M. inspection, that there was small
production then occurring at the u,1wer adit. Ex. 78 (R., p. 291). We also know that there were three
men on site, in August of 1954, "driving the upper tunnel." Id. We also know, from Anderson and
Johnson, that as of September 1954, the mine was in operation at the upper adit. Ex. 79 (R., p. 304).
Further, according to Anderson and Johnson, there had been no past production in the lower adit and
all activity in 1954 was focused on the upper adi t. Ex. 79 (R., p. 3 04).
The District Court's conclusion that both the upper and lower adits were "an active mining
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claim," accessed by vehicles year round, between 1946 and 1954 is simply unsupported by any
substantial or competent evidence in view of the clear and convincing standard. In fact, there is no
evidence that the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road (present-day South Camp Bay Road) even
extended beyond the confines of the Putnam property (Government Lots 1 and 2, platted in 1947 as
Cedarside ). No map was introduced showing any extension of the lower branch beyond the confines
of the Putnam/Cedarside property. The Latvalas base their claim on Exhibit 94, which shows a
"road" (actually labeled by the Latvalas' surveyor as a "trail") extending through the U.S.F.S.
property and into Sulphide North (the Gill property). See Response Brief at p. 9. See also Ex. 94
(R., pp. 453-54). The photograph is a contemporaty picture taken by the Latvalas who admittedly
had no personal knowledge of the condition of the road at any times prior to their 2015 purchase.
Dale Gill testified that nearly 20 years ago, when he first bought property created by the
Cedarside plat, which was accessed by the lower branch, that there was no discernible road extending
from the terminus of South Camp Bay Road near the Cummins' property and over and across the
intervening 200+/- feet of U.S.F.S. property to the north boundary of the Sulphide Claim. Tr., pp.
863-64. Gill testified, "And it was basically a path when I first came to the property and was looking
everything over. I could not drive a car up here [from the terminusofSouth Camp Bay Road's lower
branch to the northern boundary of Sulphide Claim]." Id. Gill cleared the access way, before the
Latvalas' purchase, so that he could drive a truck from the terminus of the lower branch of South
Camp Bay Road to a bench he had placed on the northern portion of Sulphide North. Tr., p. 864;
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Exs. SSS, TTT (R., pp. 751-52).
Gill's testimony is consistent with the weight of the evidence in view of the clear and
convincing standard. In short, Anderson and Johnson and the U.S.B.M. both stated any mining in
August and September of 1954 was on the upper adit and that there had been no demonstrable
production of any kind prior from the lower adit. The upper adit isn't accessed by the lower branch
of South Camp Bay Road. The upper adit is accessed by the upper branch (or Thomason Road).
This is consistent with the contemporaneous map produced in October of 1954 by the
U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. (Ex. DD ( R., p. 599)). A copy of the map was attached to the Appellants'
Opening Memorandum as Addendum H. The upper branch is the road Willard P. Puffett, Geologist,
and Webster S. Anderson, Engineer, drove on to get to the site, on October 7, 1954, for purposes of
evaluating the DMEA application. The resulting report prepared by Puffett and Anderson showed
no road extending to the lower adit as is suggested by the Latvalas. With no witness with any
personal knowledge of what happened 65 or more years ago, why is it any more reasonable or
probable, under the clear and convincing standard, to reject mapping and reporting independently
documented by U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. in the context of the DMEA application? 3
3

1n an "A. & J. Mining Company" (Anderson and Johnson) document attached to a
September 1954 "Owner's Consent to Lien," executed by Thomason, Anderson and Johnson state,
"There are good roads right to both mine shafts." Ex. 79. (R., p. 304). While Puffett and Anderson
certainly didn't see a road to the lower adit, nor did they document the same, this point is clear:
Anderson and Johnson acknowledge no past production in the lower adit. Id. Hence, even if they
were construing the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road as providing access near the lower adit,
by their own admission they didn't use such access as they had no production from the lower adit
and all mining underway in the period from August through October of 1954 was on the upper adit.
13

The evidence of any activity on the Sulphide Lode stops in October of 1954 upon rejection
of the DMEA application made by Anderson and Johnson. On appeal, the Latvalas suggest that
because the Anderson and Johnson lease was for a period of five years, commencing in September
of 1954, that "[t]his is evidence that the mining activity likely continued after 1954 until at least
1959, when the lease expired." See Respondents' Brief at p. 21. Such a suggestion runs directly
contrary to Mrs. Latvala's testimony at trial:
Q.

So you don't know, you don't have any personal knowledge as we sit here
today, of whether after this application for assistance under the DMEA was
denied, whether or not there was ever any mining on the property again?

A.

I do not know by personal knowledge, no.

Q.

And you don't know whether or not, although that lease had a five year term
... you don't know whether or not the lease was performed by anybody?

A.

Correct.

Q.

And there is no further affidavits of labor or work by anyone with respect to
the property?

A.

I don't know. I know I found one for 1954, and I did not find any later than
that.

Q.

Right. You found none after '54; correct?

A.

Correct.

Tr., p. 440.
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3.

It is Highly Probably, Based on the Location of the Mill
Foundation on Sulphide North, That the Lower Adit Was
Accessed by Water.

Exhibit YYY shows a concrete foundation of a mill adjacent to the Gill portion of the
Sulphide Claim. The same exhibit shows an interlineated circle with an "X" in the upper left comer,
evidencing the location of the lower adit. Tr., pp. 866-68. Also included in the record is Ex. AAAA,
which shows the same concrete foundation and the veritable cliff that rises above. The record did
not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, let alone by clear and convincing evidence, who
built the mill and when. In either event, the location of the mill's foundation reasonably and
probably suggests access to the lower adit by water. The District Court's finding to the contrary was
not supported by substantial evidence under the clear and convincing standard.
The original patentees of the claim received their patent in 1910. There was no evidence of
any road (be it the upper branch of South Camp Bay Road or the lower branch of South Camp Bay
Road) extending to the property during the original patentees' period of development and ownership
of the Sulphide Claim. The evidence did establish, as previously noted, that the original patentees
of the Sulphide Lode were contemporaneously locating other claims on neighboring shoreline of
Lake Pend Oreille and developing the same through the utilization of boat access. With no evidence
of any road to the claim during the original patentees' period of ownership and development, one
cannot find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the lower adit was developed by road access as
opposed to boat access. In fact, evidence clearly disregarded by the District Court suggests that
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access was by boat.

It is also possible, based upon the evidence, particularly given that no witness had personal
knowledge of any material fact, that the mill foundation was left by Howard Thomason's partner,
Fred Schilling, as a result of their short-lived partnership in 1939. Yet if this is the case, the location
of the mill by Schilling, below the lower adit and above and the shore of Lake Pend Oreille, does not
support a finding that access was had by the present-day lower branch of South Camp Bay Road.
In 1939, after Thomason acquired title to the Sulphide Lode, he and Schilling located a group
of unpatented claims adjacent to the Sulphide Lode. R., pp. 1681-82 (,r,r13-16). These claims
included the Honest John Claim and the Millsite Claim. Id.
The Millsite Claim, not surprisingly, is the site of the present-day mill foundation remnants.
Ex. CC (R., p. 591). See also Addendum E to Appellants' Opening Brief. Since Thomason and
Schilling named the claim "the Millsite Claim," upon locating the same in 1939, that either means
that the foundation was left from the original patentees' activities or that Thomason and Schilling
planned to put a mill in that location. Since Thomason thought Schilling's subsequent work on a
mill was a poor decision, one with which he did not concur, one can reasonably infer that Thomason
did not plan on putting in a mill when the Millsite Claim was located. This infers that the claim was
named "Millsite" in September of 1939 based on an existing mill foundation which would have
remained from the original patentees.
We also know from Thomason that Schilling subsequently "bui It and equipped a 25 ton mill"
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in 1939, but we know not where. We also know that Schilling lost his equipment through default,
and then stopped all work. Ex. 75 (R., p. 273). The property then remained idle until at least 1946.
Id.
The record also shows an absence of any map showing any road over the current course of
the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road to the lower adit in 1939 or before. The record also
shows, based upon Thomason's 1982 affidavit and the U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. October 1954 map, that
access was had to the upper adit by the upper branch of South Camp Bay Road. Anderson and
Johnson, in September of 1954, acknowledged no prior production in the upper or lower adits. Ex.
79 (R., p. 304).
Clear and convincing evidence must make the thing to be proved highly probable or
reasonably certain. See In re: Doe, 152 Idaho at 957. Based upon the entirety of the evidence before
the District Court, the following findings were equally reasonable and probable:
•

A mill was constructed by the original patentees through boat access adjacent
to the Gill property (the Court should note that the mill foundation is not on
the Latvala property), and the remains exist today.

•

The mill foundation that exists today constitutes the remains from a mill
constructed by Fred Schilling in 1939. Since no road has been shown to have
existed at the time, and given the proximity of the mill foundation to the
water's edge, it is more probable than not that if Schilling constructed the
mill, he did so by water.

•

Schilling constructed a separate mill at the location of the upper adit through
utilization of the then-existing Thomason Road, since that was the only site
of any alleged production.
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The only other record evidence related to the mill foundation is based on the observations
made by U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. in October of 1954. That report includes the observation, "Near
the portal of the [lower] adit is an old tool and dry shed and near the lake level to the northeast adit
are the remains of the foundation of an old mill. No other buildings are on the property." Ex. DD
(R., p. 595). Was the mill considered "old" in 1954 because it was 15 years old (i.e., a mill
constructed by Schilling) or was it "old" because it was built by the original patentees some 40 years
earlier? No one knows since no one who testified at trial had any personal knowledge ofany of these
matters. Against this background, for the District Court to conclude, utilizing a clear and convincing
standard, that the lower adit was extensively mined and operated between 1946 and 1954, by road
access, was error.

4.

The Latvalas' Efforts to Mitigate the Importance of the 1954
DMEA Report are Unavailing.

The Latvalas spent eight (8) pages of their Response Brief (pp. 28-36) in an effort to try to
"explain away" an October 18, 1954 United State Department of the Interior Report (referred to as
the "DMEA Report"). Ex. DD, (R., pp. 592-601 ). The level of energy expended by the Latvalas in
attempting to "harmonize" the DMEA Report's conclusions with the Latvalas' theories should not
be surprising. The Latvalas located a copy of the DMEA Report at least ten (10) months before trial.
Tr., pp. 429-433; 436-37. Notwithstanding, the Latvalas did not produce or disclose the document's
existence to the Appellants even though Mrs. Lat val a conceded at trial that portions of the report
were "abso 1utely" relevant. Tr., p. 44 7.
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Appellants do not claim that the DMEA Report is dispositive because the request of
Anderson and Johnson (Thomason' s lessees) for federal assistance to develop the Sul phi de Lode was
denied. Appellants claim that the DMEA Report has independent factual relevance and weight,
perhaps more than any other exhibit, because it includes the only contemporaneous map of access
to the Sulphide Lode, by an independent governmental agency, made while the claim was last alleged
to have been mined.
The facts upon which the Latvalas rely in asserting a claim for a prescriptive right are facts
of which neither they nor the Appellants have personal knowledge. What appears to have happened
here, based upon Latvalas' non-production of the DMEA Report, is that the Latvalas understood that
matters contained within the report did not buttress the theories the Latvalas had created from other
ancient documents. Yet, what could be more relevant to this suit than facts establishing how
representatives of the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. physically got to the Sulphide Claim when they
inspected it for purposes of determining whether or not it was a viable mining concern?
The following points can readily be gleaned from the DMEA Report:
•

A U.S.G.S. geologist and U.S.B.M. engineer physically traveled to the site
to meet Johnson and Anderson, Thomason' s lessees.

•

The geologist (Puffett) and the engineer (Anderson) drew a map which shows
an extension that proceeds from the terminus of Camp Bay Road in a
southeasterly direction through Government Lots I and 2 (the Putnam
property), over the Honest John Claim, and into the Sulphide Lode.

•

Puffett and Johnson also a more detailed map (Map IA) which showed access
traveling southeasterly and terminating at the upper adit and no road access
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to the road adit.
•

The road traveling to the upper adit was labeled "road" in three separate
instances.

Exs. DD (R., pp. 598-99). Copies of salient mapping portions of the DMEA Report are attached as
Addendum G and H to Appellants' Opening Brief.
The Latvalas mischaracterize Appellants' argument by stating that the Appellants are
suggesting that "an entirely different roadway than South Camp Bay Road" reached the upper
portions of the Sulphide property. See Response Brief at p. 29. South Camp Bay Road, a private
road traveling southeasterly from the terminus of Camp Bay Road, is located on Government Lots
1 and 2 (the former Putnam property later platted as Cedarside). Mapping introduced at trial shows
that South Camp Bay Road forks, with a branch traveling southeasterly to the Sulphide Claim
(referred to in these proceedings as the Hupper road" or "Thomason Road"), and a "lower branch,"
which follows the path of present-day South Camp Bay Road. Ex. G, (R., p. 537). The DMEA
Report establishes that the property was accessed when last mined over the upper branch (Thomason
Road) and not the lower branch (present-day South Camp Bay Road). In fact, the two government
officials didn't even show any map of road access to the lower adit. The Latvalas suggest to this
Court that the mapping contained in the DMEA Report is "inaccurate," as the hand drawn product
of mining examiners who were not attempting to perform a survey of the location of the road. See
Respondents' Brief at pp. 32-33. While there is no question that the map prepared by the U.S.G.S.
and U.S.B.M. representatives was not a "survey," it is nonetheless telling in the following ways:
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•

"Camp Bay," as a geographic marker, is spelled out.

•

A road approaching from the west (consistent with Camp Bay Road) is
shown.

•

A road off of Camp Bay Road, extending in a southeasterly orientation
towards the Putnam/Cedarside property (Lots 1 and 2), is shown, consistent
with historical mapping and contemporaneous conditions.

•

The road then turns in a southeasterly direction across Government Lots 2
and 1, consistent with the general orientation of the "Upper
Branch/Thomason Road," ending "within" the Sulphide Lode.

•

What is not shown is any access to the Sulphide Lode over the Lower Branch
(of present-day South Camp Bay Road).

See Ex. DD (R., p. 599). See also Appellants' Opening Brief at Addendum H.
Appellants respectfully submit that the District Court erred by finding that the Latvalas had
proven an adverse right of access over the lower branch of present-day Camp Bay Road by clear and
convincing evidence. The Latvalas' claim is directly refuted by an independently produced map of
contemporaneous access. Coincidentally, it was the very same exhibit which the Latvalas did not
produce in discovery. When a Court is resolving a case based upon "ancient documents," over
which no witness knows anything, how then can the Court make a determination under a clear and
convincing standard when no basis has been shown (or can be shown) to give one ancient document
any more weight than another? At a minimum, the Latvalas could not carry their burden by clear
and convincing proof, and it is likely circumstances such as this that led to judicial disfavor of claims
by adverse possession. Why should one who has been in title for decades be suddenly dispossessed
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based upon a selective production and "interpretation" of ancient documents over which no living
witness knows anything? The District Court's decision can only be sustained if one essentially
disregards the DMEA Report.
The Latvalas further suggest that the U.S. G. S ./U.S. B .M. map is "inaccurate" because it labels
the road a "county road." No one disputes that Camp Bay is a county road. No one (at least for now)
disputes that South Camp Bay Road is a private road. Whether Puffett and Anderson knew they
were on a county road or not is of no moment. They showed the route they took to the property, that
route arrived at the upper adit, and that route isn't present-day South Camp Bay Road (the lower
branch). Moreover, the Latvalas' attempt to suggest that South Camp Bay Road is shown as
extending into the Sulphide Claim, on a 1960 Metsker map (Ex. 53 (R., p. 199)), is simply not
supported by a review of the document itself. One can see a discernible gap between the end of
South Camp Bay Road, as contained in the 1960 Metsker map (Ex. 53), and the 280+/- feet of
intervening property held by the U.S. Forest Service. To suggest that South Camp Bay Road, in its
present location, is the road that Howard Thomason extended "into" the Sulphide Lode in 1939 or
prior is unsupported by any evidence.
Finally, while the Latvalas did not produce a copy of the DMEA Report because they thought
it was "not relevant," they now apparently believe it relevant for purposes ofits reference to "an old
tool and dry shed" on the Sulphide Lode. Ex. 81 (R., p. 311); Respondents' Brief at p. 29. The fact
that an old shed was observed on a portion of a Sulphide Lode other than the present-day Latvala
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property (Sulphide South) is apparently the basis by which the Latvalas seek to establish prior or
future residential use on Sulphide South, a separate parcel. The Latvalas' citation to the use of the
term "roads" in the DMEA Report is also disingenuous. Puffett and Anderson wrote, "The roads
leading to the property are in fair condition .... " Ex. DD (R., p. 594 ). The Latvalas apparently argue
that the use of the term "roads," in this context, means roads other than those shown on the map were
used to access the Sulphide Lode. One can clearly read from the context of the reference, in the
DMEA Report, that Puffett and Anderson had traveled 9.5 miles southeast of Sandpoint before
getting to the property, obviously traveling more than one road.

5.

The District Court gave no consideration to admissions made by
the La tvalas' predecessors-in-title.

The Mcconnaughey family acquired the Sulphide Lode property from Howard Thomason
in 1969. R., p. 1684. Brian Mcconnaughey succeeded to his father Harlow's interest in Sulphide
South. Ex. Y (R., pp.573-74). When Brian passed away, his brother Terry worked for several years
to try to sell Sulphide South on behalf of the Estate. Terry wrote to Defendant Grubb, who owns
Tract A as platted by the Cedarside plat. Terry acknowledged to Grubb that Sulphide South "has no
road access to it." Ex. 00; Tr., p. 903. 4
Unsuccessful in his first effort, Terry tried again, in August of 2014. Terry again requested

4

Exhibits 00, PP, and QQ were admitted at trial. Tr., pp. 903-05. They were omitted from
the Clerk's Record on Appeal, although the contents of all exhibits were testified to at trial by
SueAnn Dedman, FredGrubb's former wife. Tr., p. 901. The referenced exhibits have subsequently
been included in the Record on Appeal by augmentation, pursuant to the Court's March 24, 2020
Order.
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an easement over South Camp Bay Road (the lower branch). Id. Grubb declined the request, stating
that he would have to consider that "someone who purchases your land [Sulphi de South] would want
to build a road at some time. This could impact our land and land value. Ex. QQ (Aug. p. 3). Based
on the same, Terry recognized that the property would need to obtain a road easement from Green
Bay Road (to the west) and across U.S.F.S. land, a distance of about a quarter of a mile. Ex. MM
(R., p. 745).
The District Court failed to consider or give any weight to any of the McConnaughey
admissions. The Mcconnaughey family had owned Sulphide South for 36 years before the Latvalas
purchased the same. The McConnaughey family acquired the Sulphide Lode from the Thomason
family. Under Idaho law, the admission of a party's predecessor-in-title regarding matters of title
is admissible and oftentimes the best evidence available. See,~, Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886,
499 P.2d 1242 (1972).
The District Court's failure to consider or address the Mcconnaughey admissions further
undermines correctness of the Court's decision. Attempting to weigh ancient documents, of which
no party has personal knowledge, without considering the knowledge of the prior predecessor-ininterest, was error. In considering the McConnaughey admissions, this Court can and should
determine that the District Court's determination to award the Latvalas an adverse easement was
unsupported by substantial evidence under the clear and convincing standard.
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6.

The District Court Erred in Disregarding Evidence as to How
Any Use of South Camp Bay Road, for Mining, Began.

Under the general rule, the burden of proof with respect to a claim for a prescriptive easement
proceeds as follows:
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the
prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption
that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. The burden is then on the owner
of the servient tenement to show the use was permissive....
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d 1137 (1986) (citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,
557, 511 P.2d 1326 (1973)(emphasis added)).
"A prescriptive right cannot be obtained if use of the servient estate is by permission of the
landowner." Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 702, 963 P.2d 383, 385 (1998) (citing State ex rel.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 594 P.2d 1093 (1979)). "A permissive use cannot ripen into a
prescriptive easement." Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho at 704,963 P.2d at 387.
The Latvalas incorrectly claim that the issue of permissive use was not before the District
Court. In their Third Amended Complaint, the Latvalas alleged that "Thomason, his guests, and his
successors-in-interest continued to use what is now known as South Camp Bay Road in a manner
that was open, notorious, continuous, adverse and under a claim of right. ... " R., p. 15 3 0 (,4. 8). All
Defendants specifically denied the referenced allegations. R., pp. 1616, 162 9. Despite introducing
evidence as to how Thomason's use of South Camp Bay Road began, so as to negate a presumption
of adversity, the District Court didn't even consider the same. The District Court held that the
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Defendants "presented no evidence" that Thomason or his agents had used South Camp Bay Road
with the permission of any of the servient landowners. R., p. 2062. The District Court's holding in
this regard was clear error. 5
Thomason acquired the Sulphide Lode by a deed recorded on September 18, 1939. R., p.
2026 (,rt 3). Sulphide Lode, as originally surveyed and laid out, was located south of Government
Lots 1 and 2 (the Putnam property), and surrounded on three sides by property of the United States.
Ex. 3 (R., p. 38). After acquiring the Sulphide Lode, Thomason set about to locate several adjacent
unpatented claims, including the Honest John, Millsite, Lizzy "S", and Susan "T" Claims. Ex. CC
(R., p. 591). A copy generally depicting the location of these claims is attached as Addendum E to
Appellants' Opening Brief.
In 1946, Thomason stated that at the time he purchased the Sulphide Lode, he located the
additional claims in 1939. Ex. 75 (R., p. 273). At the time he located the additional claims, he
"made a deal with a farmer ... to pay the cost of development of the claims for an interest in the
property." Id. Thomason's partner built and equipped a mill, lost the mill equipment for default,
and subsequently stopped all work. Id.
With respect to the adjacent unpatented claims, '1,Notices of Mining Location" were recorded
5

Respondents cite Watkins Company, LLC v. Estate of Storms, 161 Idaho 683,685,390 P.3d
409, 411 (2017), for the following proposition: "[I]n order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the
record must reveal an adverse ruling which forms a basis for an assignment of error." The
assignment of error here is the District Court's holding that the Appellants had produced no evidence
as to how the use of South Camp Bay Road, by Thomason or his agents, had begun. For the reasons
set forth above, that ruling was unsupported by the record.
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for each such claim on September 24, 1939. R., pp. 2026-27. Each of the four ( 4) unpatented claims
was located and recorded under the names "Hilifred L. Thomason, Howard B. Thomason, and Fred
W. Schilling." R., pp. 2026-27 (,r,r15-18).
Thomason did not say he entered into an agreement with a relative (Hilifred Thomason, be
it Thomason's brother, father, wife, or otherwise). He said he entered into an agreement with a
farmer who was a male. Ex. 75, p. 273. The only other party who had an ownership interest in the
unpatented claims adjacent to the Sulphide Lode was in fact Fred Schilling.
The Latvalas respond on appeal that "there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Schilling had
an interest in the Sulphide Lode Property, as the Appellants erroneous contend." See Respondents'
Brief at p. 40. Appellants do not claim that Schilling had a recorded interest in the Sulphide Lode.
Appellants do assert, based upon the uncontroverted evidence set forth above, that Schilling had an
interest in the four adjacent unpatented claims that Thomason and Schilling jointly located and
recorded contemporaneous with Thomason's purchase of the Sulphide Lode at tax sale.
Thomason subsequently stated by affidavit that he extended the road within the Sulphide
Lode in 1938. Ex. 72 (R., p. 262). The only road shown by a contemporary map, between 1938 and
1954, as extending "within" the Sulphide Claim, is the upper branch of South Camp Bay Road
(Thomason Road), as shown in Map I of the DMEA Report. Ex. DD (R., p. 599). See also
Appellants' Opening Brief at Addendum H.
Evidence was introduced that during this same time frame, Fred Schilling was living in a
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cabin owned by John Van Schravendyk at Camp Bay. Ex. S (Green Enterprises) (R., p. 863-70).
See also Tr., pp. 1155-57.

Jim Green, John Van Schravendyk's grandson, testified that his

grandparents were living on the property at Camp Bay in 1940. Tr., pp. 1156-5 7. It defies logic to
conclude that Fred Schilling, partner with Howard Thomason in four unpatented claims and the
person originally charged with operations at the Sulphide Lode, while renting a cabin from John Van
S chravendyk, would be using those portions of South Camp Bay Road on the Van Schravend yk (now
Green Enterprises) property without permission. Why would Van Schravendyk rent lodging to
Schilling and allow him to use those portions of South Camp Bay Road on the Van
Schravendyk/Green Enterprises property unless it was with permission? Van Schravendyk was
aware of Schilling's ongoing mining activities. His letter from 1940 states as much.
Whether the mill to which Van Schravendyk makes reference was a mill placed on the
Sulphide Lode or unpatented claims by Schilling, or placed by Schilling elsewhere, is not pertinent.
What is pertinent is that Van Schravendyk had knowledge that Schilling was engaged in mining
operations while he rented Schilling lodging, and by necessity he would know if Schilling was using
the road that ran right in front of his house.
The Latvalas state "it is not the Appellate Court's function to resolve this conflicting
evidence." See Respondents' Brief at p. 42. It is this Court's function to ensure that admissible
evidence offered on a probative issue is in fact considered and weighed as part of a deliberative
process. Here, the District Court simply held that no such evidence was offered. Yet it was the
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District Court who ruled on the admissibility of the very same exhibit (Ex. S (Green Enterprises))
after overruling the Latvalas' objection. Tr., p. 1155. Jim Green actually read the contents of the
letter into the record at trial. Tr., p. 1156. When applying a clear and convincing standard against
a backdrop of ancient documents that predate the tenure, so to speak, of every witness who testified,
it is fundamentally important that all such evidence be considered.
C.

The District Court Erred by Finding That the Latvalas' Proposed
Development and Residential Uses Associated with the Latvala Property
Constituted Reasonable or Foreseeable Expansion of the Easement They
Claim by Prescription.
1.

Applicable Standards Under Idaho Law.

As a general rule, under Idaho law, an easement acquired by prescription "is confined to the
right as exercised during the prescriptive period." Elder v. Northwest Timber Company, 101 Idaho
at 359. The rationale underlying this general rule was stated as follows:
Prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and thus the rights obtained
by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by the Court.... The
quantity of use of an easement obtained by prescription is determined and fixed to
the right as exercised for the full period of time required by statutes.

We emphasize, however, that any changes in the use of a prescriptive
easement cannot result in an unreasonably increased burden on the servient estate and
that the increase in use must be reasonably foreseeable at the time the easement is
established.
Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 638-39.
Whether or not a proposed increase in use constitutes an unreasonable burden by expansion
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is a question of law.
The question of whether the increased use of the road amounts to an
"expansion of the original easement'' or merely an "increase in degree of use" is a
question of law.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 63 8.

2.

The Latvala Property (Sulphide South) Has Never Been Used for
Anything.

The Latvala property was created in 1982 when Harlow Mcconnaughey conveyed the north
half of the Sulphide Lode (the Gill property) to Elmer and Jeanette Warton. Ex. 16 (R., p. 77). The
property consisting of Sulphide South (the Latvala property) has never been used for anything,
whether prior to or after the Sulphide segregation.
Both mine adits are on the Gill property (Sulphide North), not the Latvala property. Tr., p.
972. There is no evidence that anyone has ever built a structure for residential use or for anything
else on the Latvala property. Tr., p. 977. There is only evidence of structures having previously
been built on the Gill property (Sulphide North). The foundation of the mill, whether constructed
by the original patentees or by Thomason, is not on the Latvala property. Tr., p. 439. The "old tool
and dry shed" noted in the October 1954 DMEA Report is on the Gill property. Id. The "camp"
which was noted during the U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. inspection inOctoberof1954 was not on the Latvala
property and, by all indications, could even be located on the adjacent unpatented Honest John claim.
Exs. DD (R., p. 599) and PPP (R., p. 762). Despite the evidence offered at trial by the Latvalas,
consisting solely of "ancient documents," there was no evidence that anyone had ever done anything
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on the Latvala property.
The Latvalas suggested that Matt Latvala "is a jewelry maker," but this doesn't change the
fact that nothing has ever been done on or with the Latvala property. In actuality, the extent of Matt
Latvala's "mining" efforts on the Latvala property consisted of"picking up a few rocks." Tr., p. 968.
Latvala is actually a claims adjuster. Tr., p. 923. Matt's friend "Irv" had a store many years prior,
well before the purchase of Sulphide South, where Matt once displayed some homemade jewelry.
Tr., p. 928, 930-32.

3.

The Lower Branch of South Camp Bay Road is Narrow and
Lightly Used.

The road width of the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road varies from between ten
(10) to twelve (12) feet. Tr., pp. 1109-10. Given that many of the houses in Cedarside are seasonal,
there is minimal traffic in the winter and spring and modest traffic in the summer. Defendant Russ
Edwards, a year round resident in Cedarside who accesses his home off of the southern branch of
South Camp Bay Road, testified the daily road use of the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road
varies from one car in the winter, to four cars in the spring, to perhaps a dozen cars in the summer.
Tr., p. 1109.
The lower branch of South Camp Bay Road narrows beyond its terminus at the Cummins
property. The Latvalas' surveyor, Mark Duffner, originally described the extension beyond the
Cummins property as "a trail" eight feet in width. Ex. TT (R., pp. 644-45). Defendant Dale Gill
testified that nearly 20 years ago, when he first bought property in Cedarside, there was no
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discernible road extending over the intervening 280+/- feet of U.S.F.S. property toward the north
boundary of the Sulphide Lode. Tr., pp. 863-64. Gill cleared a path so that he could drive a car from
the terminus of the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road, at the Cummins property, across the
U.S.F.S. property, and to his bench overlooking Lake Pend Oreille on Sulphide North. Tr., p. 864;
Exs. SSSS, TTTT (R., pp. 751-52).
Matt Latvala acknowledged that the narrow width of the southern branch of South Camp Bay
Road would not lend itself well to full-sized equipment necessary to build the Latvalas' requested
road over the Sulphide North (the Gill property) to Sulphide South (the Latvala property). Tr., p.
941. Matt testified:
Q.

Wouldn't it be true that you would have to bring in some equipment if you're
going to construct a roadway [across the Gill property]?

A.

Yeah, we would have to bring in equipment. Ultimately, looking at the road,
it narrows way down. I honestly don't know if you can get full-sized
equipment. If we could get the biggest equipment in there, our road is
simple. It's absolutely- you can blast it through. But since the road narrows
itself way down, we may have to go to smaller equipment.

Tr., p. 941.

4.

As a Matter of Law, the La tvalas' Proposed Use of a Prescriptive
Easement, for the Purposes Stated, Constitutes an Unforeseeable
Increased Burden on the Lower Branch of South Camp Bay
Road.

The Latvalas brought suit against Gill, seeking to locate the expressed easement over
Sulphide North that was reserved at the time of the Sulphide segregation. The location of that
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easement has been fixed by the District Court's Judgment and Amended Judgment. Gill has taken
no appeal. The location of that easement is final.
That having been said, the ability of the Latvalas to utilize the lower branch of South Camp
Bay Road for purposes of reaching the judicially-determined express easement over the Gill property
remains in question, and is the subject of this appeal. The Latvalas sought relief allowing them to
establish a prescriptive right over the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road and to expand that right
to allow for construction of the improvements associated with the expressed Gill easement and a
personal residence on the Latvala property. As a matter of law, those proposed uses constitute
unreasonable and unforeseen expansions of any right acquired by the Latvalas by prescription.
In order to construct the improvements associated with the expressed easement as determined
on the Gill property, the Latvalas will require the following:
•

A 25-foot width with a road surface of 10 feet.

•

200 feet of upslope retaining walls.

•

190 feet of downslope retaining walls.

•

Retaining walls varying in height from four to 10 feet.

•

Pedestals four feet in width to serve as a base for the 390+/- retaining walls.

•

Excavation of the easement area by blasting or jackhammers.

•

Removal of "a significant volume of bedrock," once blasted or
jackhammered, by large dump trucks.

•

Transportation across the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road of some
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350 concrete blocks, each weighing 2,000 pounds or, alternatively, pouring
a concrete retaining wall in place through the use of cement mixers varying
in width between 8 and 9.5 feet.
Tr., pp. 652-53, 655, 657, 662, 679, and 809.
Given the narrow width of lower branch of South Camp Bay Road, there is no staging area
either at the road's entrance or terminus. Tr., p. 658. Accordingly, every one of these trucks, cement
mixers, excavators, and flat beds would have to travel down the lower branch of South Camp Bay
Road, occupying the entire road width, and then back out the same way. Tr., pp. 1109-10.
This isn't solely a question of whether or not one or two daily cars down the southern branch
of South Camp Bay Road would constitute an unforeseeable or unreasonable expansion in use. The
sheer totality of the Latvalas' intended improvements, including both a residence and the
improvements necessary to reach that residence, and all construction associated therewith, cannot,
under any reasonable interpretation, be found to be less or equally intensive as any proven historical
usage. The determination of whether or not such a use is an unreasoanble increased burden is a
question of law left to this Court. The District Court erred and Appellants request that the Court
reverse the same.

5.

The Latvalas' Remaining Arguments Are Unavailing.

The Latvalas seem to suggest that the Appellants are claiming that the Latvala property
cannot benefit by a prescriptive right which may have been established prior to the Sulphide
segregation. This is inaccurate. While Appellants strenuously contest the factual and legal validity
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of the Latvalas' claimed prescriptive easement, should this Court nonetheless affirm the District
Court's determination in that regard, then the entirety of the Sulphide Lode (be it the Gill property
or the Latvala property) is the "benefitted" property of such an easement. However, that does not
mean that the Latvala property, following the Sulphide segregation, can unforeseeably increase the
scope and intensity of any uses previously made during the prescriptive period. 6
The Latvalas suggest that their proposed use of the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road
"to access their property primarily for residential purposes, represents a substantial decrease in the
burden on the servient estate, as there will be far fewer trucks than were necessary to transport
mining equipment and tons of ore over the roadway." See Respondents' Brief at p. 55 (emphasis
in original). The Latvalas paint with an overly broad brush. The Latvalas' proposed use does not
consist solely of constructing a house on Sul phi de South. It consists of building 200 feet of road way,
with 390 feet of significant retaining walls, and all of the construction activity related to the same.
Moreover, the Latvalas' statement that trucks transported "mining equipment and tons of ore"
over the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road is directly refuted by the Latvalas' own evidence.
Anderson and Johnson, in September of 1954, at the end of the alleged prescriptive period, stated
there had been "no past production" in the lower adit (the adit the Latvalas claim was accessed
intensively for mining purposes by the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road). Ex. 79 (R., p.

6

This Court has held, in Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P .2d 870 ( 1977) that the
subdivision of a property benefitted by a prescriptive easement, following establishment of a
prescriptive easement, can logically lead to an unforeseeable intensification of use.
35

304).
The Latvalas also point out that Defendant Russell Edwards, a contractor, testified that he
constructed three of the homes in Cedarside, which access off of the southern branch of South Camp
Bay Road. R., pp. 2065-67. The Latvalas further point out that the District Court noted Edwards'
construction of these homes and found that the Latvalas' proposed activities were no different in
kind or degree. There is a fundamental distinction that neither the Latvalas nor the District Court
appreciate: the homes in Cedarside, including the homes constructed by Russell, are specifically
benefitted parties by an expressed easement.
The Court will recall that in 1927, John Van Schravendyk (as to Government Lot 3) granted
a right-of-way to Lida Putnam (for the benefit of Government Lots 1 and 2). Ex. N (R., pp. 554-55).
Putnam contemporaneously confirmed to Van Schravendyk that" [t] he road would still be private .... "
Ex. T (Green Enterprises) (R., p. 858). When the Cedarside plat was recorded, in 1947, the
Cedarside lots were created out of the former Putnam property, and specifically benefitted by the
expressed private easement. Ex. P (R., p. 557). The Sulphide Lode is not in Government Lots I and
2 and is therefore not entitled to use the expressed easement rights of the Cedarside lot owners to the
extent that those easement rights are greater in scope or degree than any rights acquired by the
Latvalas' predecessors-in-title through adverse possession.
Finally, the District Court's conclusion that future residential use on the Latvala property was
foreseeable, in 1954, is unsupported by any evidence, substantial or otherwise. The Sulphide Lode
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was patented as a mining claim in 1910, landlocked on three sides by property of the United States.
The Putnam property (Lots 1 and 2) was private property, not even contiguous to the Sulphide Lode,
and accessed by an express private easement. Evidence of mining activity between 1946 and 1954
includes the aforementioned admission by Johnson and Anderson that no production was had by the
lower adit (purportedly accessed off the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road). The 1954 DMEA
Report, which the Latvalas did not produce, shows that access to the upper adit was over a different
road (the upper branch of Thomason Road). As to the south half of the Sulphide Lode, there is no
evidence that it has ever been used for anything.
Against this background, how then is it foreseeable, as a matter of law, that 61 years later,
someone would claim a right to use the southern branch of South Camp Bay Road to construct a 200
foot long road with 390 feet of retaining wall and a residence? Not to mention that all of these
improvements would be on property surrounded on three sides by U.S.F.S. land. Whether or not a
use under these circumstances is foreseeable or an unreasonable increase in burden is a question of
law. The District Court erred in its determination. 7

7

The Latvalas suggest that there was actually evidence of residential structures on the
Sulphide Lode during the period of alleged adverse activity. There was the foundation of "an old
mill." No one could live in that. There was an "old tool and dry shed." No one could live in that.
There was a "camp," on either the north half of the Sulphide Lode or on the Honest John claim,
when the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. inspectors were present. But a "camp" is not consistent with
construction of a 200 foot thoroughfare to get to a private residence.
37

III.

ARGUMENT AS TO THE LATVALAS' ISSUES ON APPEAL.
Once the District Court ruled in favor of the Latvalas on their prescriptive easement claim,

it declined to rule on other claims advanced by the Latvalas, determining the same to be "moot.''
The claims dismissed a "moot" include the following:
(1)

The Latvalas' claim for an easement by necessity over Sulphide North (the
Gill property);

(2)

A declaration that South Camp Bay Road is a public road; and

(3)

Condemnation of a right-of-way and utilities under Idaho Code §§7-701, et
seq., 47-701, et seq., and/or 47-901, et seq.

See Respondents' Brief at p. 61.
The Latvalas argue that, in the event this Court reverses the District Court's finding of a
prescriptive easement or the District Court's finding the that the prescriptive easement would not
been unreasonably or unforeseeably expanded, that the matter should be remanded for a decision on
those claims which the District Court determined to be moot. The Latvalas are not entitled to the
requested relief.
First, as to the claim for an easement by necessity over Sulphide North. This claim was set
forth in the Second Cause of Action in theLatvalas' Third Amended Complaint as against Defendant
Gill. R., pp. 1531-3 3. Any claims against Defendant Gill are not properly before this Court. They
have been fully adjudicated and determined.
The District Court entered its Amended Judgment on September 5, 2019. R., pp. 2180-97.
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Only Defendants Green Enterprises, Frank, and Cummins appealed from the Amended Judgment.
R., pp. 2224-50. The Latvalas then filed a cross-appeal from the appeal taken by Green Enterprises,
Frank, and Cummins.
Defendants Gill did not file an appeal. The Latvalas took no direct appeal from the District
Court's decision finding that the Latvalas' claim for an implied easement against the Gills was moot.
The cross-appeal was taken as to Appellants Green Enterprises, Frank, and Cummins. Defendants
Gill are not party to this appeal. As the Latvalas acknowledged, "the relief against the other
Defendants [including Gill], including the confirmation of the existence of a prescriptive easement
over the portions of South Camp Bay Road that cross their respective properties, is conclusively
established." See Respondents' Brief at p. 6. Any claim against the Gills, that was dismissed as
moot, has been merged into the final Amended Judgment, as to Gill, from which no appeal has been
taken or is pending.
As to the Latvalas' various claims for condemnation, they fail to state claims as a matter of
law and no point would be served by a remand. Idaho Code §7-701, et~- codifies Idaho's general
eminent domain statutory regime. While Idaho law recognizes a private right of condemnation under
certain circumstances, that right does not extend to a claim by a private person to condemn a rightof~way to provide access to a private residence. Cohen v. Larson, 125 Idaho 82, 867 P.2d 956
(1993). No point would be served by remanding the claim for trial when it is invalid as a matter of
law under the facts at bar.
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Section 4 7-701, et seg. applies to mineral rights in state lands, not a privately-owned patented
mining claim. No private cause of condemnation is recognized by this statutory regime, and it would
make no sense to remand the matter for trial on a claim that cannot be stated.
Idaho Code §47-901, et seg. authorizes the owner of a mining claim to "acquire a right-ofway for ingress and egress, when necessary in working such mining claim .... " Seel.C. §47-901. The
Latvalas have failed to state a claim under this provision, as no evidence was introduced of any
mineral potential or any mining history of any kind or nature on the south half of the Sulphide Lode.
Moreover, the Latvalas have acknowledged that their "proposed use of the roadway to access their
property [is] primarily for residential purposes .... " See Respondents' Brief at p. 55. Private
residential use has nothing to do with the necessity of working a mining claim. Under these facts,
as a matter oflaw, the Latvalas fail to state a claim under LC. §47-901.
Lastly, the Latvalas sought a judgment "declaring South Camp Bay Road as a public road,
or subject to an easement in favor of the public," with no supporting legal authority. R., p. 1531
(ljfljf4, 13). The law in Idaho is clear "that one individual's prescriptive use cannot inure to the benefit

of anyone else." State ex rel. Haman, 100 Idaho at 146. In other words, the "general public," as
distinguished from specific individuals, cannot acquire prescriptive rights to private property absent
specific statutory authorization. It would make no sense to remand the Latvalas' claim that South
Camp Bay Road be declared a public road as the same fails as a matter of law. See,~' In Re:
Estate of Bagley. 117 Idaho 1091, 1093, 793 P .2d 1263, 1265 (Ct. App. 1990) supporting the
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proposition that a remand is unnecessary as to a cause of action that fails to state a claim.

IV.

THE LATVALAS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
OR COSTS ON APPEAL.
The Latvalas seek an award of attorney fees under LC. §12~121 and IAR 41. The Latvalas

suggest that Appellants have brought this appeal without foundation and that Appellants are only
asking this Court to reweigh the evidence. The Latvalas are mistaken and their request for attorney
fees should be denied.
First, IAR 35(b)(5) specifically states, ''If the Respondent is claiming attorney fees on appeal
the Respondent must so indicate in the division of additional issues on appeal that Respondent is
claiming attorney fees and states the basis for the claim." The Latvalas did not identify a request for
attorney fees as an HAdditional Issue Presented on Appeal" in Section II of their Brief.
Second, "A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement involves
entwined questions oflaw and fact." Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho at 396. A determination as
to whether or not a claimed prescriptive right has been unreasonably or unforeseeably expanded is
also a question oflaw. Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 638. In either event, the claim must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
This is not a case where the Appellants are simply asking the Court to reweigh evidence
under a Hpreponderance of the evidence" standard. The law disfavors the creation of prescriptive
rights. Prescriptive claims operate as a penalty to the landowner. They must be proven by a
heightened standard. That heightened standard is "clear and convincing."
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"Clear and convincing" evidence is evidence "highly probable or reasonably certain." In Re:
Doe, 152 Idaho at 957. This is not a case where the District Court, sitting as the trier of fact, was
called upon to weigh the credibility and demeanor of witnesses as to events that are alleged to have
formed the bases for the claims. These events happened 60 or more years before the suit was filed.
None of the witnesses know anything about the facts relative to the claims.
The claims were proven by documents which were equally unfamiliar to the witnesses. In
many instances, the documents contradicted themselves. The DMEA Report says access to the
Sulphide Lode was by virtue of the upper branch (Thomason Road). Thomason's lessees, Anderson
and Johnson, said no production had been had in the prior years from the lower adit. Yet to find as
the District Court did is tantamount to picking and choosing from ancient documents over which no
one knows anything. Under the clear and convincing standard, a District Court could not find that
one statement from Howard Thomason was more credible than a statement by representatives of the
U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. No one can say, under a clear and convincing standard, that it is "highly
probable or reasonably certain" that one document's deceased author is more credible than another
document's deceased author. The evidence was contradictory and the District Court's findings,
ostensibly predicated upon clear and convincing evidence, were in and of themselves not supported
by substantial evidence.
This appeal has been pursued in good faith and with a factual and legal basis. When a party
pursues an action which contains fairly debatable issues, the action is not considered to be frivolous
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and without foundation. Security Investor Fund, LLC v. Crumb, 165 Idaho 280,291,443 P.3d 1036,
1047(2019).
V.

CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse. the Amended Judgment of the

District Court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants on the Latvalas' claim for

a prescriptive easement over those portions of the lower branch of South Camp Bay Road as are
owned by Appellants. Alternatively, if this Court finds it appropriate to affirm the District Court's
ruling as to the prescriptive easement claim, it should nonetheless reverse the District Court's
Amended Judgment which allowed for the expansion of use of the easement to include residential
use of the Latvala property and construction of road improvements within the area encompassed by
the judicially-decrees expressed easement on the Gill property. The Court should also deny the
Latvalas the relief they request through their cross-appeal, as there are no viable claims to try on
remand. Appellants further request that the Latvalas' request for an award of attorney fees and costs
be denied and that the Appellants be awarded their cost on appeal.
DATED this

/0

-fz__
day of June, 2020.

JO
for Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents
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